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TAX-FREE STOCK REDEMPTIONS FROM
CLOSELY HELD CORPORATIONS
Frequently the shareholders of closely held corporate business wish
to affect a change of ownership and in connection therewith attempt to
withdraw the existing earnings and profits of the corporation and have
these taxed at the capital gains rate under Sec. 302 of the Internal Revenue
Code rather than having them taxed as ordinary dividends under Sec. 301.
Since the early part of the last decade, the Internal Revenue Service
has broadened its attack on redemptions by asserting in some cases that the
distribution by a corporation in redemption of its stock may be essentially
equivalent to dividends constructively received by the shareholders who
have not had their shares redeemed. This attack is based upon Sec. 302
(b) (1) of the IRC of 1954. Virtually no problem arises when the selling
shareholder sells his interest in toto to a third party or even to the remaining shareholder outright. The problems arise when, due to the lack of
available cash in the hands of the proposed buyer, it is decided that the
corporation shall redeem all or part of the selling shareholder's interest
out of its accumulated earnings.
This note will deal with the three usual redemption situations:
The first concerns the situation in which A and B own virtually all
of X Inc. B wishes to retire from business and A wishes to purchase B's
interest but is without sufficient cash to accomplish an out-right purchase.
X Inc. has sufficient accumulated earnings to effect a redemption of B's
shares and thus complete the desired transaction.
In the second A is the sole shareholder of X Inc. B wishes to purchase X's operating assets or a part of these assets but not its accumulated
earnings. X redeems enough of A's shares to rid itself of its accumulated
earnings and B purchases the remainder or a part of the remainder of
A's shares.
In the last situation A and B own virtually all of the shares of X Inc.
C wishes to purchase A's interest but has only enough cash to purchase
part of it. C purchases what he can and X Inc. redeems the remainder.
At the same time X Inc. redeems an equal amount of B's shares so that B
and C will own an equal interest in the corporation.
I
The leading case in the first situation is that of Holsey v. Commissioner
of Internal Revenue.' The J. R. Holsey Sales Co., a New Jersey corporation, was organized on April 28, 1936, as an Oldsmobile dealership. Petitioner had been president and a director of the company since its organization. Of the 2500 shares authorized only 20 were issued. These 20 shares
were issued to Greenville Auto Sales Co.
On April 30, 1936, petitioner acquired from the Greenville Co. an
1. 258 F.2d 865 3rd Circuit, (1958).
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option to purchase 50% of the outstanding shares of the Holsey Co. and
a further option to purchase all the remaining shares. In November of
1939, petitioner exercised the first option. Subsequently, the second option
was amended to allow an extension of time in its exercise. This revised
option was in favor of the petitioner individually and was not assignable to
anyone other than a corporation in which he owned not less than 50%
of the voting stock.
On January 19, 1951, petitioner assigned his revised option to the
Holsey Co. which immediately exercised the option and paid the Greenville Co. $80,000 for the stock held by it. This transaction resulted in the
petitioner becoming the owner of 100% of the outstanding stock of the
Holsey Co. At the time the option was exercised, the accumulated earnings
of the Holsey Co. were in excess of $300,000. The Commissioner determined that the effect of the transaction constituted a dividend to petitioner,
the remaining stockholder, on the ground that the transaction was for the
benefit of the petitioner and that there was a lack of corporate purpose.
These factors, it was contended by the Commissioner, made the redemption
essentially equivalent to a dividend.
The 1939 Internal Revenue Code, under which the court decided the
case, in Sec. 115 (a), defines a dividend as a distribution made by a corporation to its stockholders. The court, in this regard, stated, "Accordingly
unless a distribution which is sought to be taxed to a stockholder as a
dividend is made to him or for his benefit it may not be regarded as either
a dividend or the legal equivalent of a dividend." 2 (emphasis supplied)
The court then added:
"... where, as here, the taxpayer was never under any legal obligation to purchase the stock .... having merely the option to purchase which he did not exercise but instead assigned .... the dis-

tribution did not discharge any obligation of his and did not
benefit him in any direct sense." 3
As to the government's second contention, that there was no corporate
purpose for the transaction, the court said that it is the effect of the transaction, rather than the purpose which actuated it, which controls the determination of dividend equivalence.
The court added further that the most significant criterion in determing equivalency is whether the distribution leaves the proportionate interests of the stockholders unchanged as occurs when a true dividend is
paid.
The IRS acquiesced in the Holsey decision but stated that, "if the
stock is in reality purchased by a remaining shareholder and is paid for
by the corporation, . . .

,

the payment will be considered as a dividend

to the shareholder who made the purchase." 4
2.
3.

Ibid, p. 868.
Id.

4.

Rev. Rul. 58-614, C.B. 1958-2,920.
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In 1960 the IRS again attempted to establish dividend equivalency
on the theory of "lack of corporate purpose" in Erickson v. United States5
In the Erickson case, the majority shareholder of the corporation had died
and the executors of his estate desired to liquidate his shares. Of the
remaining shareholders, only the taxpayer was actively engaged in the
corporate business. Due to this, all were desirous that he assume majority
ownership. The taxpayer, however, was limited by his lack of available
assets, to the purchase of only a part of the deceased's shares, and the corporation lacked sufficient liquid assets with which to retire the remainder.
One of the other shareholders had sufficient funds available to purchase
the stock but was not interested in a long term investment. Thus it was
agreed that this shareholder would supply the funds and such loan would
be secured by the taxpayer's promissory note and the placement of the
shares in escrow. With the agreement was the understanding that the corporation would repay the amount from its funds as soon as it was financially
able to do so and that the shares would then be retired. 6 One year and
four months later the corporation was financially able to complete the transaction and did so by paying the taxpayer's note and taking the shares from
him. The court, citing with approval from the Holsey case, stated:
It is not necessary that a corporate purpose for retirement of the
shares, as distinguished from a purpose of all of its shareholders,
be shown, for the reason that it is the effect of the retirement of
the shares, not the purpose which actuated it, which controls the
determination of dividend equivalence.*
The court further held that the tax consequences of a transaction
depend upon the substance of the transaction and are not to be determined
solely from the legal form employed. Here, the court said, in reality, the
shares involved were purchased by the corporation from the estate, with
the taxpayer acting as a temporary respository therefore until the total
transaction could be consummated by the corporation's retirement of the
shares.
The IRS was justified in believing that a "corporate purpose" was still
an essential criterion in determining dividend equivalency because of
Decker v. Commissioner" which was decided by the Tax Court in 1959.
One contention made by the IRC was the lack of a valid business purpose
but the court held that a plan for the acquisition and redistribution of treasury stock to key employees was a valid business purpose.
As further evidence that the "corporate purpose" doctrine has not
been laid to rest, the Tax Court once again relied upon it in Kerr v. Commissioner,9 a 1962 case . Here the court found that the strengthening of
5.

189 F. Supp. 521 (S.D. Il. N.D. 1960).

6.

It is not clear from the report of the case but apparently the parties treated the

8.

32 T.C. 326 (1959).

9.

38 T.C. 723 (1962).

transaction as a loan to the corporation in the first instance with it then purchasing
the shares from the decendent's estate. This then puts the taxpayer in the position
of a surety on the loan.
7. Erickson v. United States, supra note 5 at p. 524.
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the credit position of two affiliated corporations and the conservation of
cash through the medium of being able to file consolidated returns was
not such a valid purpose as to overcome dividend equivalency.
The Decker case, however, is more important from the aspect of the
Commissioner's argument concerning "benefit" to the remaining stockholders as a criterion for equivalency. Five persons had each originally
owned one hundred shares, the total being all of the outstanding shares of
the corporation. These stockholders entered into a stock purchase agreement
whereby, upon the death of one of the shareholders, the survivors would
purchase his shares from his estate. However, when one of the parties to
the agreement died, the surviving shareholders lacked sufficient funds to
make the purchase in accordance with the agreement. Therefore it was
decided that the shareholders would make the purchase but tile corporation
1
would immediately purchase the stock from them. (
The court held that even though the shareholders were legally obligated
to purchase the shares there was not such a benefit to the shareholders as
would warrant dividend treatment because there was no true economic
benefit advanced. This, the court said, was because the shareholder's interest did not increase.
They had the same amount of cash and the same number of shares
of stock after the transactions were completed as they had before
the death of the deceased stockholder. Their stock represented
a higher percentage of equity in the basic assets of the company,
but those basic assets were reduced proportionately so the stock
actually represented the same values ....

11

Even though the Decker case held as it did concerning the discharge
of a legal obligation, one should not place too much reliance on it in
12
cases with different factual circumstances. In Priester v. Commissioner,
decided by the Tax Court in May of 1962, the major contention made by
respondent was that the redemption operated to discharge the petitioner's
legal obligation to purchase the stock under a stock-purchase agreement
and that this established dividend equivalency. The court, instead of deciding that this did not establish equivalency as in the Decker case, determined that the stock-purchase agreement had already been terminated
before the redemption. The court added further:
. . . if the Priester Corporation had then employed its earned
surplus to discharge said obligation of petitioner to Marjorie
[tile selling stockholder], without receiving adequate consideration therefore from petitioner, such action of the corporation
would have effected a constructive distribution of a taxable divi13
dend to petitioner ....
10.
11.
12.
13.

The shareholders were on dangerous ground as will be discussed with the second
situation; and why the corporation did not purchase directly from the estate, which
would alleviate the danger, is not understood.
Decker v. Commissioner, supra note 8 at p. 332.
38 T.C. 316 (1962).
Ibid, p. 324.
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Further aid for the government in this regard came in McGinty v.
Commissioner,14 decided by the Tax Court in September of 1962. In
1946 the petitioner acquired 666 2/3 shares of Berkshire Family Laundry,
Inc., out of a total of 2,000 shares outstanding. A testamentary trust
owned the remaining 1,333 1/3 shares. In 1950 petitioner bid $40,000 for
the stock owned by the trust and his bid was accepted. At the time petitioner did not have the cash necessary to meet his commitment, and the
trustees volunteered to help him acquire the money to purchase the stock.
On November 21, 1950, the corporation borrowed $42,000 and immediately
lent petitioner's wife $40,000 of this amount of the loan. Petitioners wife
thereupon paid $40,000 to the trustees, who in turn endorsed the 1,333 1/3
shares to petitioner. In 1954, the corporation acquired the stock from
petitioner in cancellation of the note receivable from petitioner's wife.
The court first found that the fact that petitioner's wife was the maker
of the note was of no consequence as she was plainly acting upon his behalf. Then the court stated that the redemption operated to discharge the
obligation of the note and thus it was substantially equivalent to the payment of a dividend to the extent of accumulated earnings.
Petitioner's major argument was that he could have achieved the
same result by having had the corporation purchase the shares directly from
the trustees and in this manner could have obtained freedom-from-dividend
treatment. The court agreed with this theory but quoted an oft-cited
phrase from Woodruff v. Commissioner:
If a taxpayer has two legal methods by which he may attain a
desired result, the method pursued is determinative for tax purposes without regard to the fact that different tax results would
15
have attached if the alternative procedure had been followed.
In 1960, the Tax Court issued a memorandum decision in GlennMinnich Clothing Co. v. Commissioner,'6 which set forth the proposition
that if the remaining shareholders paid for the stock prior to its redemption
by the corporation, such would be treated as a constructive dividend. Little
litigation has been found on this point but it is believed that the outcome
of such prior purchase transactions will always be deemed to be equivalent
to a dividend.
Ward v. Rountree17 is perhaps the most comprehensive opinion written
concerning situation one. In the Ward case, the taxpayer and his brother
each owned one half of two different corporations, one in Missouri and
one in Tennessee. The taxpayer was president of the Tennessee Corporation and he formulated its policies and directed its business and administrative activities. He was also vice-president and a director of the Missouri
Corporation. In similar fashion, taxpayer's brother was president of the
14.
15.
16.
17.

88 T.C. 882 (1962).
131 F.2d 429, 430, 5th Circuit (1942).
60,207 P-H Memo T.C. (1960).
193 F. Supp. 154 (M.D. Tenn. Nashville Division, 1961).
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Missouri Corporation, fomulated its policies and directed its business and
administrative affairs. Because of differences of opinion in the management of the two corporations, it was decided that each brother would relinquish his interest in the corporation of which the other was president.
That is, taxpayer would sell his stock in the Missouri Corporation to that
corporation, thus leaving his brother the complete owner, and the brother
would do the same with his stock in the Tennessee Corporation. The Tennessee Corporation thus purchased the brother's shares at a price based
upon the fair market value. Taxpayer reported no income resulting from
this purchase, but the IRS determined this to be income to taxpayer in the
form of a constructive dividend.
As in previous cases of this kind, the government's major argument was
that the transaction was a benefit to the remaining shareholder. The
court, citing at length and with approval from the Holsey case, stated that
unless the transaction serves to discharge an obligation of the remaining
stockholder, it is not such a benefit as will give rise to dividend equivalency.
The government further argued that certain factors in this case were
indicative of a taxable dividend: (a) that the corporation had no plan of
contracting its business activities subsequent to the stock redemption; (b)
that there was no plan for dissolution or ultimate contraction; and (c)
that only nominal dividends had been paid, notwithstanding the fact that
large amounts of undistributed earnings were permitted to accumulate. To
this contention, the court stated:
While such factors may be considered in a proper case to determine
whether all purchases of its own stock by a corporation taken
together accomplish the same result as a declaration of a dividend,
they are not significant here. .

.

.

The important factor here is

that the redemption was a complete redemption of all the stock
(emphasis
owned by Joseph Ward [the taxpayer's brother].'
supplied)
It is thus apparent that in cases in which the factual situation is similar to that of situation one, the IRS is finding it increasingly difficult to
establish dividend equivalency. The "lack of corporate purpose" argument
seems to have lost favor except in the Tax Court 19 and the argument of
"benefit to the remaining stockholder" is restricted to situations in which
the transaction operates to discharge a legal obligation.
II
This situation concerns the tax treatment to be given the shareholder
whose shares are redeemed in accordance with a plan whereby an outsider
purchases only the operating assets of the corporation.
At the outset a caveat is in order. The redemption of A's shares
should be accomplished after B's purchase. If the redemption occurs be18.
19.

Ibid p. 158.
Supra note 8.
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fore the purchase, it will be deemed essentially equivalent to a dividend to
the extent of accumulated earnings and profits.
An early case, Zenz v. Quinlivan2° decided under the 1939 IRC, held
that where the taxpayer effects a redemption which completely extinguishes
the taxpayer's interest in the corporation, and he does not retain any
beneficial interest whatever, such transaction is not the equivalent of the
distribution of a taxable dividend.
After this and an earlier case 21 of similar circumstances, the IRS acquiesced, though announcing that such transaction "will be closely scrutinized to determine whether the selling stockholder ceases to be interested in
the affairs of the corporation immediately after redemption." 22 Subsequently, the IRS announced that it would apply the Zenz case to transactions governed by the 1954 Code, so that the redemption will qualify
23
under Sec. 302 (b) (3) as a sale.

Regardless of the acquiescence, however, litigation continued on the
subject, with the taxpayer being successful in all instances where his total
interest was redeemed. 24 One of the better cases from the taxpayer's stand
point was that of Summerfield v. United States25' The taxpayers, husband
and wife, had originally owned the stock jointly. Pursuant to a plan for
the redemption of the wife's interest, the jointly owned stock was surrendered to the corporation and separate certificates were issued to each.
Two days later the corporation redeemed Mrs. Summerfield's stock and
the amount paid to her was reflected on the corporation's books as a reduction in capital and earned surplus. The government argued for stock
attribution 26 and also dividend equivalency. Citing with approval the
Zenz case,27 the court stated that since Mrs. Sumerfield's shares were redeemed, thus extinguishing her entire interest in the corporation, dividend
equivalency could not be found.
While freedom from dividend treatment is thus found where the entire
interest of the stockholder is redeemed, it has not been afforded where only
a part of the interest is surrendered. A recent case concerning this problem is Neff v. United States.2s Here the taxpayer was the sole shareholder
of the 100 outstanding shares. In the course of operations it became necessary for the corporation to raise needed capital and, despite there being
400 authorized but unissued shares, the plan which the corporation adopted
was for the redemption of 47 of the taxpayer's shares and the reissuance of
20.
21.
22.
23.

123 F.2d 914. 6th Circuit (1954).
Edenfield v. Commissioner, 19 T.C. 13 (1952).
Rev. Rul. 54-458, 1954-2 C.B. 167.
Rev. Rul. 55-745m 1955-2 C.B. 223.

24.

In re Lukens' Estate, 246 F.2d 403 3rd Circuit

25.

145 F. Supp. 104 (E.D. Mich., N.D. 1956).

26.
27.
28.

(1957); Mayer v. Donnelly, 247

F.2d 322 5th Circuit (1957).

Caveat. This case was decided under the 1939 IRC which had no provision
analogous to Sec. 318 or the 1954 IRC which concerns stock attribution.
Supra note 17.
305 F.2d 455, U.S. Court of Claims (1962). Cert denied, 835. Ct 827.
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these. In return the corporation cancelled a note receivable and a loan
receivable which the shareholders owed to the corporation. Subsequently
38 of these redeemed shares were sold. The taxpayer's assertion of nonequivalency was founded on two contentions; that the redemption was
undertaken exclusively for a valid corporate purpose, to raise corporate
capital, and that after the redemption and subsequent to the sale of 38
of the 47 redeemed shares taxpayer's proportionate holdings of outstanding shares had changed radically.
The court first summarized Sec. 302 of the 1954 IRS and Senate Report
No. 1622, 83rd Congress, 2nd Session, concerning Sec. 302.29 It then continued with its determination of equivalency, stating that while evidence
of a valid corporate purpose might be used with other evidence, it is not
of itself dispositive, ". . . it does not establish, per se, non-equivalence."3 0
The court also placed great emphasis on the fact that the corporation had sufficient authorized but unissued shares which it could have sold
to effect the desired purpose.
The only difference between the newly-issued-stock procedure and
the redemption method selected was that the latter resulted in a
$19,035 distribution from the corporation's accumulated earnings
and profits. In this context the distribution is entirely divested
of any relation to the ultimate change in proportionate ownership
upon sale of the redeemed shares, and bears every attribute of a
pro rata corporate distribution constituting a dividend. 31
To the taxpayer's contention that his interest had changed radically
the court said that the time when the change in proportionate interest
is to be determined is immediately after the redemption, not after the
whole transaction. Thus, after the redemption the taxpayer held the
same interest as before, because he still owned all of the outstanding shares.
III
This situation concerns the tax treatment to be given a remaining
shareholder when there has been a pro rata redemption of his and the
leaving shareholder's stock. The decision rendered in United States v.
Carey32 in 1961, was startling in the light of prior decisions concerning
redemption.
Carey-Brown Motors, Inc. had been incorporated in 1948. Carey and
29.

Sec. 302(a) is applicable if any one of sub-paragraphs (1),(2),(3) or (4) of
sub-section 302 (b) applies. Interesting to note is the test which the Senate Committee proposed: "The test intended to be incorporated in the interpretation of
paragraph (1) (of 302(b)) is in general that currently employed under section
115(g) (1) of the 1939 Code. 'our committee further intends that in applying

this test for the future that the inquiry will be devoted solely to the question of
whether or not the transaction by its nature may properly be characterized as a
sale of stock by the redeeming shareholder to the corporation." (emphasis supplied).
30. Neff v. United States, supra note 28 at p. 457.
31.
It is interesting to note that this conflicts with prior holdings to the effect that
it is the method used and not some alternative method that might have been used
which is determinative for tax purposes. Woodruff v. Commissioner, Supra note 15.
32. 289 F.2d 531, 8th Circuit (1961).
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Brown each contributed $20,000 and each received 200 of the 400 shares
of stock issued. In 1950 a stock dividend was declared and distributed,
raising the stock ownership of Carey and Brown to 300 shares each. Brown
had other interests in which he participated and had never devoted much
time to the operation of the corporation. In 1954, due to an increase in
the competiveness of the business, it was decided that Brown should sell
his interests to someone who could devote full time to the business of the
corporation. At this time, Brown's interest in the corporation was worth
about $50,000 and it was soon discovered that an interested buyer with
that amount of capital could not be found. However, an employee of the
corporation was willing to buy the Brown interest, providing it could
be done for $22,000. Thus a reduction in corporate assets was decided
upon as the expedient to consummate the original plan of sale. The
following arrangement was then entered into:
1. Pro rata redemption by the corporation from Carey and Brown
of 290 shares (145 each). In exchange the corporation transferred
its buildings and book accounts to Carey and Brown.
2. A lease of the building to the corporation for a 3 year period.
3. Brown then sold two of his remaining shares to Carey and the
balance of 153 shares to the employee.
Undoubtedly this was a pro rata redemption, and if the transaction
had stopped before the purchase by the employee, the original shareholders
would have been given dividend treatment to the extent of earnings and
profits. But the court didn't view the transaction at that point and instead considered it as a whole. Citing Herman v. Commissioner33 which
had laid out seven different criteria in determining whether a redemption
is essentially equivalent to a dividend, the court said that there was no
single or conclusive test, and further stated that:
In our present case . . . The net effect of the redemption upon

the two stockholders was very different from the distribution of a
dividend. The relations of the stockholders to the corporation
were very materially changed. The results of the execution of the
plan was very different from the distribution of a dividend. Instead each shareholder retaining his pro rata interest in the
company, as is the result of the usual dividend, Brown's interest in
the corporation was in all respects completely terminated. Carey
for the first time became a majority stockholder and Larson the
purchasing employee acquired a stock interest.
.. . the stock redemption as to Brown and Carey was made as a
result of the same identical corporate action and for the same
33.

32 T.C. 479, affirmed, 283 F.2d 227, 8th Circuit (1960). Among these criteria
are: The presence or absence of a bonafide corporate business purpose; whether
the action was initiated by the corporation or by the stockholders; did the
corporation adopt any plan or policy of contraction, or did the transaction
result in a contraction of the corporate business; did the corporation continue
the corporate business; did the corporation continue to operate at a profit;
whether the transaction resulted in any substantial change in the proportionate
ownership of stock held by the shockholders; what were the amounts, frequency and significance of dividends paid in the past; was there a sufficient
accumulation of earned surplus to cover the distribution, or was it partly from
capital.
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business purpose. If there was no pro rata distribution to Brown,

there could be no pro rata distribution as to Carey.3 4 (emphasis
supplied)

A further point of interest in the Carey case is that the court cited with
approval Mertens Law of Federal Income Taxation3 5 which states:
... it seems correct that no point should be made of the fact that
the sale of part of the shares to a third person precedes rather
than follows redemption of the balance. Since the two transactions
are part of the same plan the order in which the sale and redemption take place should be immaterial ...
In March of 1962, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit handed
down its decision in Ballenger v. United States.36 Here the taxpayer and
the other shareholders owned both preferred and common stock in the
corporation. All of the preferred stock and the other shareholder's common
stock was redeemed, leaving the taxpayer as the sole shareholder. While
the transaction was different from that in Carey, as in Carey the redemption
was pro rata. After deciding that the provisions of the IRC concerning
partial liquidation would not suffice to grant freedom from dividend treatment, the court then considered the equivalency aspects. The court Adetermined that two lines of decisions appear in determining equivalency.
The first applies a "net effect" test.
Under this test, the court must hypothesize a situation where the
corporation did not redeem any stock, but instead declared a
dividend for the same amount. . . . the redemption is equivalent
to a dividend if the results from the hypothetical 3dividend
and the
7
actual stock redemption are essentially the same.
The court went on to state that under this approach, factors to be
considered are whether the same shareholders would have received the
identical payments had the redemption been a dividend, and whether the
redemption altered the shareholders' control over the corporation, and their
respective rights to its future earnings. The court then held:
Considering all of these factors, it becomes apparent that every
pro rata redemption will be equivalent to a dividend, for in no
way can it result in any alteration in the relationship of the shareholders, both with respect to their share of the distribution in
question and in respect to future control and profits. 3 8 (emphasis
supplied)
The second line of cases add to the "net effect" test the further consideration of whether or not there are legitimate business purposes for
the redemption. The court cited Carey as authority for this point and
then went on to find that no valid business purpose existed for the redemption. By distinguishing the Carey case to this extent the court did not have
34.
35.
36.
37.

United States v. Carey, Supra note 32 at p. 538.
Volume 1, Section 0.104.
301 F.2d 192, 4th Circuit (1962).
Ibid, p. 196.

38. Ibid p. 199.
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to rule contra to it. The cases do provide an interesting comparison because the court in Carey stated that pro rata redemptions are not necessarily to be treated as equivalent to a dividend, but that the whole transaction (net effect?) should be viewed; while the court in Ballenger stated
that the redemption must not be given capital gains treatment because a
pro rata redemption will always be essentially equivalent to a dividend.
What is to be the outcome of Carey and pro rata redemption? It is
too early to draw any definite conclusions but if the Eighth Circuit continues to view the over-all effect of such transactions rather than the effect
immediately after the redemption, and if other Circuits follow this reasoning, taxpayers' percentages of success in such cases will increase.
SAM T.

ISHMAEL

